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Introduction
Remedies are increasingly used by antitrust agencies (in short: AA) in the US and EU to clear merger proposals which are otherwise subject to serious anticompetitive concerns (see FTC, 1999 , EU, 2006 , and OECD, 2011, for recent remedy reviews). 1 The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the EU Merger Regulation allow for remedial o¤ers to address competitive concerns (see DOJ, 2010, and EU, 2004, respectively).
The EU Remedy Notice states that "the most e¤ective way to restore e¤ective competition, apart from prohibition, is to create the conditions for the emergence of a new competitive entity or for the strengthening of existing competitors via divestiture" (EU, 2008, Article 22) . Accordingly, remedies are o¤ered by the merging parties to e¤ectively protect competition and to remove any competition concern the AA may have.
The following principles in association with remedies are stated both in EU and US regulations concerning remedies (see, EU, 2008, and DOJ, 2011, respectively): First, the remedy is designed and proposed to the AA by the merging …rms, while the AA can either reject or accept the o¤er. 2 Second, a remedial divestiture may go to an already existing competitor or to a new entrant …rm. Third, the remedy must be proportional to the competitive concern (see EU, 2004, Article 30).
Taking care of those features, we analyze the impact of remedies on (horizontal) merger activity in oligopoly. We consider remedies in the form of physical asset sales ("divestitures"). 4 We assume that a merger produces synergies which makes it desirable from a consumer perspective in the …rst place. 5 We show that the possibility to clear a merger conditional on remedies enlarges the set of pro…table and acceptable mergers (under a consumer surplus standard). In addition, the set of mergers is even further enlarged when we consider divestitures to entrant …rms. We obtain endogenously that divestiture proposals are always proportional to the competitive concern. That is, a lower merger synergy level must induce a larger divestiture proposal. Comparing divestitures to an incumbent competitor and an entrant …rm, the latter type allows to clear a merger with less asset sales which gives rise to a larger parameter range for successful mergers.
We show that the type of divestiture (either to a competitor or an entrant …rm)
critically depends on the merging …rms' ability to extract rents from the purchaser of the assets. Most importantly, we show that the type of divestiture is optimal from a social welfare perspective, if the merging …rms can extract the entire gains from trade.
This result follows from noticing that a merger with remedies is always externality-free (i.e., leaves consumer surplus and outsiders' pro…ts unchanged). It is then immediate that the merging parties make the socially optimal decision, when able to extract the entire gains from trade. If, however, rent-extraction is limited, then the divestiture either goes to an entrant …rm in the absence of any bargaining power (which involves minimal divestitures) or to a competitor under a bidding scenario (as the competitor has always a larger maximum willingness to pay than an entrant …rm).
The merger remedy guidelines of the DOJ distinguish between "…x-it-…rst remedies" 4 Remedies are distinguished into structural and behavioral remedies (see EU, 2008 , and DOJ, 2011).
Structural remedies involve asset sales to counter anticompetitive e¤ects of a merger, while behavioral remedies target the merged …rms'after merger business conduct (see DOJ, 2011, p. 6). 5 Our analysis is placed in a Cournot setting in which synergies are necessary to make consumers not worse o¤ after the merger (see Farrell and Shapiro, 1990a; Spector, 2003; Verge, 2010) .
2 and "post-consummation sales" (DOJ, 2011, pp. [22] [23] [24] [25] . The guidelines clearly favor an adequate …x-it-…rst remedy, while the post-consummation sale is much more restrictive (and costly) for the merging parties. Quite bluntly the remedy guidelines state: "For the parties, resolving a merger's competitive issue with an upfront buyer can shorten the divestiture process, provide more certainty about the transaction than if they (...) must seek a buyer for a package of assets post-consummation, and avoid the possibility of a sale dictated by the Division in which the parties might have to give up a larger package of assets" (DOJ, 2011, p. 22) . Entering into a consent decree is costly, full of uncertainty, and further burdened with a crown-jewel provision which has to be o¤ered to make the remedy more attractive for potential buyers. Those additional costs create commitment value for the merging …rms in the …x-it-…rst sales process because a failure to reach an agreement may make the entire merger unattractive. If the selling power becomes maximal, then our analysis shows that the merging …rms select the social welfare maximizing purchaser of the assets.
We can also show that the merging …rms have a strong incentive to search for the most e¢ cient buyer as this tends to increase the feasible set of mergers and, at the same time, keeps the asset sales necessary to induce an approval at its lowest possible value. We also identify instances which lead to mergers under a remedy rule which are strictly pricedecreasing. First, a divestiture to a competitor …rm which is able to realize synergies may lead to lower prices, and second, sequential mergers may induce a series of (price-…xing) divestitures which may lead to a strictly price-decreasing merger among newly created …rms.
Our paper contributes to the analysis of mergers in Cournot oligopoly when productive capital in an industry is …xed (Perry and Porter, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990a,b; McAfee and Williams, 1992) . That approach was applied to structural remedies in Medvedev (2007), Verge (2010) , and Vasconcelos (2010) . Verge (2010) shows that under fairly general conditions a re-allocation of productive assets through remedies can-not increase consumer surplus when synergies are absent. Medvedev (2007) shows for a three-…rm oligopoly that remedies in association with merger synergies extend the scope for acceptable mergers. Vasconcelos (2010) analyzes remedies for the case of a four …rm oligopoly when merger synergies are possible. Each …rm owns one unit of capital and capital is indivisible. He assumes that the AA maximizes consumer surplus which is crucial when at least three …rms are involved in a merger. In those instances he shows the possibility of an "over-…xing"problem associated with remedial divestitures (see also Farrell, 2003) . The AA uses its power to restructure the industry optimally. Over…xing may have adverse e¤ects because a …rm may abstain from proposing a (socially desirable) merger with two other …rms. Instead, the acquirer expects (correctly) that the AA will use its power to sell one of the acquired …rms to the remaining competitor. Consequently, the acquirer may strategically propose a one-…rm takeover which can be worse from a consumer point of view than allowing a takeover of two other …rms. Hence, remedies may not serve consumer interest as the antitrust authority is "overshooting" in terms of consumer protection. Cabral (2003) analyzes mergers in a di¤erentiated industry with free entry. When assets are sold to an entrant …rm as a remedy, then a "buy them o¤"e¤ect follows which means that an entrant …rm is dissuaded from opening a new store (or introducing a new product variant). That e¤ect may work against the interest of consumers, who are better o¤ the more variants are o¤ered in the market.
Recently, the impact of remedies on the e¤ectiveness of merger control has been examined empirically (see , for the EU and Clougerthy and Seldeslachts, 2012, for the US). 6 Those works use an event study approach which identi…es the anticompetitive e¤ect of a merger by abnormal stock market returns of competing …rms. Overall, the results appear to indicate that an upfront-buyer remedy 6 Ormosi (2012) analyzes major EU merger cases and shows that remedial o¤ers and e¢ ciency claims are often strategic to avoid costly delay in litigation processes.
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tends to restore the pre-merger competitive situation.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In Section 3 we conduct the merger analysis for three di¤erent merger control regimes depending on whether or not remedies are feasible and the type of the purchaser (either a competing …rm or an entrant …rm). In Section 4 we compare the merger outcomes in the di¤erent merger control regimes with regard to pro…table and approvable merger outcomes.
In addition, we also analyze the social welfare e¤ects. Section 5 presents three extensions. In Section 5.1 we show that the optimal remedy type (divestiture to competitor or to entrant …rm) depends on the merged …rm's ability to extract rents from the buyer. Section 5.2 analyzes the merging parties'incentives to search for the most e¢ cient purchaser. Section 5.3 presents a dynamic merger game to show that remedies tend to support higher concentration outcomes which are strictly desirable from a consumer perspective. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We analyze the e¤ects of remedies in a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products.
There are n 3 symmetric …rms indexed by i 2 I = f1; :::; ng. All …rms produce a homogenous good with inverse market demand given by p(X) = 1 X, for X < 1, where X is the sum of …rms' individual outputs, x i ; i.e., X := P i x i . Firm i's production costs depend on its output level, x i , and the capital, K i , it uses for production. Total productive capital of the industry, K, is …xed and fully distributed among the …rms in the industry; i.e., K i > 0 for all i 2 I and
Speci…cally, …rm i's production 7 We perform a short-run analysis which is appropriate as competition authorities typically make prediction only for the "foreseeable" future (see, e.g., DOJ, 2011, p. 31).
cost is given by
We normalize K i to one, so that each …rm uses one unit of capital in the absence of a merger. It then follows that K = n.
The benchmark solution is the n-…rm Cournot oligopoly equilibrium which describes the market outcome before the merger. 10 When all …rms i 2 I maximize their pro…ts
i simultaneously by choosing their outputs, we obtain that each …rm produces x (n) = 1=(n + 3), realizes pro…ts of i (n) = 2=(n + 3) 2 , while the market price is
The AA adheres to a consumer standard. A merger, therefore, is approved if and only if the price level is not larger after the merger when compared with the pre-merger equilibrium p (n). We distinguish three di¤erent merger control regimes depending on whether or not remedies are possible and on the remedy type. No-remedy (in short: N R): When merger guidelines do not allow for a remedial divestiture, then the AA can either approve or block the merger proposal altogether.
Divestiture to entrant (in short: DE): In this case merger control allows for an approval conditional on a divestiture of a share of the target …rm's assets to an 8 The underlying idea is that a …rm's cost function depends critically on the amount of capital it owns, while overall capital in the industry is …xed. A merger then combines the capital of the former independent …rms. In addition, marginal costs are increasing in the output level which mirrors the capacity constraint implied by the …xed capital assumption.
9 That speci…cation of the cost function is borrowed from Perry and Porter (1985) and it was used in works as Farrell and Shapiro (1990b) We examine a bilateral merger with …rm 1 being the acquirer and …rm 2 the target …rm. Firms 1 and 2 will merge if the merged entity's pro…t does not fall short of their pre-merger pro…ts, 2 i (n). A merger may lead to a synergy which is measured by the parameter s 2 [0; 1]. The synergy rotates the cost function downward such that marginal costs for a given level of output come down. Precisely, the cost function of the merged …rm M (which combines the assets of …rms 1 and 2) is given by
, where is the share of …rm 2's capital which stays under control of the merged …rm. 12 If s is close to one, the synergy of the merger is negligible, while for smaller values of s the merger's synergy becomes larger.
Accordingly, 1 is the share of …rm 2's capital which goes as a divestiture to another …rm which may be an existing competitor or a new entrant …rm. An entrant …rm E which obtains the divestiture 1 operates with the cost function
whereas an incumbent competitor (say …rm i = 3) which gets the divestiture 1 produces with the cost function C 3 (
We analyze the following merger game. In the …rst stage, …rm 1 proposes to merge with …rm 2. Depending on the merger control regime it may o¤er a remedial divestiture to the AA which will con…rm a merger proposal if and only if the price level does not increase after the merger. 13 In the second stage, depending on the AA's observable decision, all 12 That is, we suppose that the acquirer will divest parts of the target …rm's assets in case the AA requires a remedy to approve the merger. We could also assume that the authority requires to divest parts of the acquirer's assets which would not change the results of our analysis. 13 This setting mirrors merger control practice in the EU and US, where the merging …rms are expected to propose a remedial divestiture in case of competitive concerns.
7 independent …rms compete in Cournot fashion.
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Merger Analysis
No-remedy (regime NR). Under the no-remedy regime, the AA can only clear or reject the merger proposal in its entire. Hence, if a merger is approved, then = 1 always holds.
, while the remaining n 2 competitors (indexed by j 2 J = f3; : : : ; ng) have a pro…t function of the form j = p(X)x j x 2 j . Firms' simultaneous output choices give rise to a system of n 1 …rst-order conditions with the following solutions:
and (2)
, for all j 2 J.
Inserting the equilibrium values (2)-(3) into the inverse demand function, p(X), we obtain the equilibrium price
The equilibrium pro…t of the merged …rm M is given by 
Inspecting the right-hand side of (5), we get that s max (n) is monotonically decreasing. In the limit we get lim n!1 s max (n) = (3 p 41 7)=16 0:763.
Lemma 1. In a symmetric 3-…rm Cournot oligopoly a two-…rm merger is strictly profitable for all s 2 [0; 1]. For n 4, a bilateral merger is strictly pro…table if s 2
From Lemma 1 it follows that a bilateral merger is always pro…table independently of the number of …rms whenever the synergy is large enough; i.e., s s max (1) 0:763
The price level does not increase after the merger if p p
Inserting the equilibrium values (1) and (4), respectively, we obtain
which is true for s 1=2. Hence, an AA which applies a consumer welfare standard will block the merger whenever s > s = 1=2 and allow the merger for s s = 1=2.
Interestingly, the decision rule is independent of the pre-merger concentration level (i.e., it does not depend on the number of …rms n). We summarize those results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose a no-remedy merger control regime ( N R). Then only mergers which create relatively large synergies with s s := 1=2 are cleared, while merger proposals with small synergy levels s > s are blocked by the AA.
We next allow for asset sales sought as a remedy for the increased market power resulting from a merger which is an issue if the merger's synergy parameter, s, is greater than one-half.
Divestiture to entrant (regime DE).
With a remedy rule at hand the AA can make a merger proposal conditional on structural remedies. We assume that the AA accepts all remedial o¤ers which o¤-set any price-increasing e¤ect of the merger proposal. That is, the remedy is only relevant if the post-merger price is expected to be higher than the pre-merger price in the absence of a remedial divestiture. From Lemma 2, this is the case if s > 1=2. In those instances, the acquirer may o¤er a divestiture of a share of the target …rm's capital, 1 , which su¢ ces to …x the consumer price at the pre-merger level.
Consider the case of divestitures to a new entrant …rm, E. The pro…t function of the merged …rm M , the entrant …rm E, and the remaining rival …rms j 2 J, are given by
, and j = p(X)x j x 2 j , respectively. In a Cournot equilibrium the following …rst-order conditions must be ful…lled:
x E = 0, and (7) p(X) x j 2x j = 0; for all j 2 J.
Solving this system of n equations, we obtain …rms'equilibrium output levels
, and (10)
with (n) := 3n + 12s + 8 + 2n 8s 7 2 n 2 + 6ns 2ns + 15. Substituting the equilibrium values (9)- (11) into the inverse demand, p(X), we get the post-merger price depending on the synergy level, s, and the divestiture, 1 , which yields
15 Using symmetry for all j 2 J, X = x M + x E + (n 2)x j must hold in equilibrium.
The post-merger price (12) is not larger than the pre-merger price (1) if
Di¤erentiating the denominator of (13), (n), with respect to n, we obtain
which is always strictly positive. Evaluating (n) at the lowest possible value of n, we obtain (3) = 30s + 14 14s 10 2 + 24; which is strictly positive for all admissible values of s and . Hence, the sign of (13) A divestiture, 1 > 0, is only necessary for low synergy levels, s > 1=2. Taking the inverse of condition (14), we obtain the critical value
from which the divestiture level, 1 DE (s), follows which is necessary to leave the price level unchanged after the merger. Hence, for every merger with synergies, s 1, there exists a unique critical value DE (s) such that the post-merger price level is not larger than the pre-merger price, whenever the divestiture is large enough (i.e., 1 1
is ful…lled). As a consequence, a merger proposal with a certain synergy level s < 1 can only pass the decision screen of the AA if at least the share 1 DE (s) of the target …rm's capital is sold to an entrant …rm. Finally, from (14) it follows that s DE ( = 1) = 1=2.
Hence, any bilateral merger with su¢ ciently large synergies (i.e., s 1=2) is non-price increasing. 16 Given the AA's decision rule, we can now examine the pro…tability of a merger proposal. This is an issue when synergies are relatively small (i.e., s > 1=2), because the AA will then require a divestiture according to (15) . Given s > 1=2, the merged …rm's pro…t is 
The sign of the right-hand side of (16) Divestiture to competitor (regime DC). Again, consider a merger between …rms 1 and 2. A share of 1 of …rm 2's capital is possibly divested to an incumbent competitor …rm j 2 J, say …rm 3. De…ne L := Jnf3g as the set of the n 3 remaining incumbent competitors. The pro…t functions of …rm M , …rm 3, and the remaining competitors
, and
l , respectively. In equilibrium, the following …rst-order conditions must be ful…lled:
p(X) x 3 2x 3 2 = 0, and (18)
Solving this system of n 1 equations, we obtain the equilibrium output levels
, and (21)
with (n) := 4n + 12s + 12 + 3n 6s 6 2 n 2 + 8ns 2ns + 18. Substituting (20)- (22) into p(X), we obtain the post-merger price depending on the synergy level, s, and the divestiture requirement, 1 , which yields
The post-merger price (23) is not larger than the pre-merger price (1) if
Note that @ (n)=@n = 4+3 2 +8s 2s ; which is always strictly positive. Evaluating (n) at the lowest possible value of n, we obtain (3) = 30 + 36s + 21 12s 9 2 ;
18 Using symmetry for all l 2 L, X = x M + x 3 + (n 3)x l must hold in equilibrium.
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which is strictly positive for all admissible values of s and . Hence, the sign of (24) depends only on the numerator which yields the condition
It is easily checked that s DC ( ) is strictly concave, obtains a unique maximum at = 1=2
with s DC ( = 1=2) = s DC := 9=16 0:56, and is equal to one-half at points 2 f0; 1g.
Hence, for any s 2 [1=2; s DC ], there are two solutions 1 (s) = (1 p 9 16s)=2 and 2 (s) = (1 + p 9 16s)=2, such that the price level does not change after a merger.
Given the AA's decision rule, we can now examine the pro…tability of a merger proposal. The merged …rm's equilibrium pro…t is
2 which must not fall short of the joint pre-merger pro…t level of …rms 1 and 2, 2 . Note that
Hence, the divestiture, 1 , must ful…ll condition (25) 
The denominator of the right-hand side of (27) For s 2 (s DC ; 1], a merger is never approved.
We are now in a position to summarize the impact of remedies in merger control and we can evaluate the welfare consequences of remedies. We do so in the next section. 
The right-hand side of (28) while the di¤erence of the divestiture levels increases when the synergy level decreases.
Moreover, any merger with minimal divestitures is externality-free.
The last part of Lemma 5 follows from noticing that minimal divestitures imply that the pre-merger price is not a¤ected by the merger. The next proposition summarizes the analysis of the merger game under regimes N R, DE, and DC with regard to the equilibrium merger outcome and the equilibrium divestiture level. It is easily checked that the minimal divestiture is increased under regimes DE and DC. Moreover, under regime DE, it is no longer true that a price …xing remedy exists for any s 1. Overall, the scope for pro…table mergers with divestitures decreases signi…cantly. level unchanged. It then follows that the …rst-order conditions of the outsider …rms (either …rms j 2 J under regime DE or …rms l 2 L under regime DC) also remain una¤ected by the merger (see (8) for regime DE and (19) for regime DC). As a consequence, the social welfare e¤ect of remedies then only depends on a comparison of total production costs for the …rms involved in the merger (…rms 1 and 2) and the …rm which is the bene…ciary of the divestiture policy (either …rm E under regime DE or …rm 3 under regime DC). Let us call those …rms the insiders. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose s 2 (s ; s DE ], so that a merger is only cleared with remedies.
Then there exists a critical value b s, with s < b s < s DC , such that the ordering of social welfare (which follows from a comparison of the insiders'total production costs) depends on the synergy parameter, s, as follows:
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that a merger control regime which allows for remedies is always preferable from a social welfare perspective when compared with regime N R. Proposition 2 also mirrors the fact that total production costs tend to be lower the more equal the distribution of capital among …rms becomes. If the divestiture is relatively small, then regime DC leads to the highest welfare level. The entrant …rm's capital is so small in that case, such that insiders' production costs are larger under regime DE than under regime DC. However, part ii) of Proposition 2 also shows that there exists an interval for relatively large divestiture levels (associated with relatively small synergies), where regime DE outperforms regime DC. In that case, two e¤ects tend to lower insiders' total production costs under regime DE when compared with regime DC: Firstly, the entrant …rm gets a relatively large share of …rm 2's productive capital, and secondly, the divestiture level is smaller under regime DE than under regime DC, so that a larger share of production goes to the merged …rm which bene…ts from synergies.
Finally, part iii) of Proposition 2 shows that for lower synergy levels regime DE outperforms both regime DC and regime N R. In that area, a merger is only an equilibrium outcome under regime DE, whereas a merger cannot occur under regimes DC and N R.
Overall, those results indicate that it is not necessarily optimal that remedies go to an entrant …rm. In contrast, Proposition 2 shows that this is only the case when divestitures have to be large. It then follows that the entrant …rm obtains a su¢ ciently large share of the productive capital which has the positive e¤ect of lowering its total production costs.
If, however, the divestiture is relatively small, then a divestiture to an existing competitor is preferable from a social welfare perspective as this results in a more even distribution of the productive capital in the industry.
Extensions
In the following we discuss three extensions. First, we examine the optimal remedy type (divestiture to competitor or to entrant …rm) depending on the merged …rm's ability to extract rents from the buyer. Second, we analyze how the e¢ ciency of the buyer (competitor or entrant) a¤ects the set of equilibrium merger outcomes. Third, we show that remedies may support higher concentration and strictly lower prices in a dynamic merger game when …rms can merge sequentially in pairs.
Endogenous Remedy Type
Part ii) of Proposition 1 shows that there is a range of synergy levels, with s 2 (s ; s DC ], such that both a divestiture to an entrant and a divestiture to a competitor constitute acceptable remedies for the AA. Which remedy is optimal from the merging …rms'perspective? To answer this question, we distinguish three cases: …rst, selling the divestiture at a …xed price, second, auctioning o¤ the right to buy the divestiture, and third, the case of perfect seller power, in which case the merging …rms can make a take-it or leave-it proposal to a pre-selected buyer.
Selling at a …xed price. Assume that the divestiture is sold at a …xed price which does not exclude any potential buyer. 20 Then the merged …rm selects the buyer which guarantees the highest after-merger pro…t level; i.e., it compares DE M with DC M . 21 If we assume that the merged …rm can optimally adjust the size of the asset sales, we can apply Lemma 5 which states that the optimal divestiture is strictly larger if sold to a competitor. Moreover, optimal asset sales guarantee that the pre-merger price p stays put after the merger. Independently of the divestiture type, the merged …rm's …rst-order condition then becomes
from which we obtain the after-merger output level
which is decreasing in the divestiture level, 1
. 
The left-hand side of (29) is the maximum pro…t the merged …rm might realize if it divests to a competitor, while the right-hand side is the merged …rm's maximum total pro…t in case of a divestiture to an entrant …rm. We have just shown that (29)). 22 This assumption can be relaxed if many potential entrants bid for the divestiture. 23 Note that a merger which is cleared with remedies 1 DE (if the buyer is an entrant …rm) or with 1 DC (if the buyer is an existing competitor) is always externality-free (see Lemma 5). Hence, if the entrant …rm acquires the divestiture, then all competitors' pro…ts remain at their pre-merger level, .
Similarly, if a competitor, say j = 3, acquires the divestiture, then the remaining competitors' pro…ts stay constant at the pre-merger level. It then follows that all competitors j 2 J have the same maximum willingness to pay for the divestiture. i) If the divestiture is sold at a …xed price which does not exclude any potential buyer, then the merged …rm sells the divestiture to an entrant …rm.
ii) If the divestiture is sold through an auction in which all buyers bid their maximum willingness to pay, then the divestiture goes to a competitor.
iii) If the merged …rm can make a take-it or leave-it o¤er to a pre-selected buyer, then the divestiture is sold to a competitor for s 2 (s ; b s), and sold to an entrant …rm for
Proposition 3 shows that the merged …rm's ability to extract rents from the asset sale is critically determining the divestiture type. If, for some reason, potential buyers can avoid to get absorbed in a bidding race, so that rent extraction is severely limited, then a divestiture to an entrant …rm should be most likely. In that instance, the merging parties minimize the amount of assets to be sold. If rent extraction is enhanced, for instance, when the asset sale is structured through an auction-type selling process, then the divestiture should be expected to go to an existing competitor. In an auction, competitors'maximum willingness to pay always exceeds the maximum bid of an entrant …rm. Finally, part iii)
of Proposition 3 shows that the merged …rm's divestiture decision is perfectly aligned with the social welfare maximizing rule (see Proposition 2), whenever the merged …rm can commit to a take-it or leave-it o¤er to a pre-selected buyer. The merged …rm is then able to extract the entire surplus created by the divestiture process. As the trade of divestitures is externality-free, it follows that the merged …rm makes the socially optimal choice.
The message of Proposition 3 is that the merging parties should have a maximum of power in the asset sales process, because this must lead to a selection of the socially preferred buyer type. Intuitively, the merging parties maximize the gains from trade under the remedy constraint. As any merger with remedies is externality-free, it then follows that the socially optimal buyer is selected.
It is noteworthy that remedy guidelines mirror our …ndings. For instance, the merger remedy guidelines of the DOJ distinguish between "…x-it-…rst remedies" and "post consummation sales" (DOJ, 2011, pp. [22] [23] [24] [25] . Successful …x-it-…rst remedies eliminate the competitive concerns and allow the AA to clear the merger without the need to …le the case in court. In contrast, post-consummation sales induce the AA to …le the case in court to obtain a consent decree which allows to enforce and monitor the remedial provisions because of the court's contempt power. The guidelines clearly favor an adequate …x-it-…rst remedy, while the post-consummation sale is much more restrictive (and costly) for the merging parties. With regard to the …x-it-…rst remedy, the guidelines "provide the parties with the maximum ‡exibility in fashioning the appropriate divestiture" (DOJ, 2011, p.
22). Accordingly, the merging parties can adjust the divestiture freely, so that the assets 22 can be "tailored to a speci…c proposed purchaser" (DOJ, 2011, p. 22), In contrast, if a consent decree is needed for a post-consummation sale, then the guidelines build up a credible threat of force. First, a package of assets to be divested must be identi…ed in advance, and second, "crown-jewels" must be o¤ered "to increase the likelihood that an appropriate purchaser will emerge"(DOJ, 2011, p. 24).
Those rules increase the commitment value of the merging parties when proposing an asset sale to a potential purchaser to obtain a …x-it-…rst remedy. First, the guidelines give a maximum of ‡exibility in adjusting the asset sale to the competitiveness of the purchaser. Second, entering into a consent decree is costly, full of uncertainty, and further burdened with the crown-jewel provision. Those additional costs may make the entire merger unattractive, adding to the commitment value necessary to extract rents in the …x-it-…rst sales process.
E¢ ciency of the Buyer
We show that mergers become more likely when the purchaser can more e¢ ciently employ the divested assets. We analyze the case of a competitor buyer and the case of an entrant buyer separately. In the former case, potential competitors may be heterogenous with regard to their ability to generate synergies when merging their businesses with the divested assets ("heterogenous competitors"). In the latter case entrant …rms may di¤er concerning their e¢ ciency ("heterogenous entrants"). 24 In our basic model a divestiture is only proposed for s > 1=2, which ensured that the divestitures implied by (15) and (26) are always strictly positive. Introducing the possibility that the buyer can be more e¢ cient than in our basic model, gives rise to the problem that a merged …rm with synergies s very close to 1=2 may want to propose an 24 Motta, Polo, and Vasconcelos (2003) describe another concern which relates to collusive behavior after merger. Buyers may di¤er regarding their competitive behavior in the future. If the AA is not well informed, then the merging …rms may want to select the least competitive type of buyer.
23
in…nitesimal small divestiture. Below we see that this is an issue when competitors are heterogenous. To determine the smallest possible divestiture, from now on we assume 2 [0; 1 "], with " > 0 and arbitrarily small. We call the smallest possible divestiture an "-divestiture.
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Heterogenous competitors. Suppose that competitors have di¤erent abilities to generate synergies when merging their businesses with the divested assets. Let parameter t be a measure of that ability, so that a competitor of type t has the cost function
if it merges its assets with the divested assets 1 . It is natural to assume s t 1, so that the competitor buying the divestiture does not realize larger synergies than the merging …rms. We can use the analysis of our basic model (regime DC) to solve for the new divestiture requirement DC (s; t); which takes the buyer's type into account. Using the system of …rst-order conditions (17)- (19), while noticing that the buyer …rm has marginal costs 2tx=(2 ) instead of 2x=(1 + ), we obtain a new requirement DC (s; t) = 8 < :
from which the price-…xing divestiture rule 1 DC (s; t) follows. Obviously, a lower value of t (i.e., a more e¢ cient buyer type) implies a smaller divestiture. Comparison with the former divestiture rule (26) shows that a lower value of t implies that the merging …rms can achieve a price-…xing remedy with less divestitures. Solving for the maximal approvable synergy level, we obtain from (30) that all mergers with synergy parameters
can pass the decision screen of the AA. Again, comparison of (31) with condition (25) shows that s DC ( ; t = 1) = s DC ( ), while @s DC ( ; t)=@t < 0. Hence, a divestiture to a more e¢ cient buyer (lower value of t) increases the scope for approvable mergers. The lowest approvable synergy level s is, again, reached at = 1=2; where s DC (1=2; t) = 9=(16t), which increases when t is reduced. The smallest possible value of t is t = s. At this point, all mergers with synergy parameters s s DC (1=2; s) = 3=4 are approvable (note the di¤erence to s DC (1=2) = 9=16 according to Lemma 4).
For t < 1, we also obtain "-divestitures which are strictly price-decreasing. The smallest possible parameter value of s such that a price-…xing divestiture (larger than an "-divestiture) exists follows from lim !1 s DC ( ; t) = 1=(2t). Hence, all merger proposals with synergy parameters s 2 (1=2; 1=(2t)) are then cleared with an "-divestiture. In all those instances, the post-merger price must be strictly smaller than the pre-merger price, so that consumers are better o¤ after the merger.
We next check the pro…tability condition (27) for the divestiture condition (30) , which gives for Overall, those results show that the merging …rms have strong incentives to search for an e¢ cient buyer (be it an incumbent competitor or an entrant …rm). If successful, this increases the likelihood of a pro…table and approvable merger. Interestingly, an "-divestiture may become possible when the buyer is a competitor. In those instances the price level decreases, so that consumer surplus increases as well.
Remedies in Sequential Mergers
We have so far seen that remedies increase the scope for mergers, which already indicates that remedies can lead to more asymmetric market structures with higher measures of concentration. In this section we propose a sequential merger process to derive the ultimate equilibrium market structure, which can be expected when remedies are feasible. 29 We refer to our basic model and we restrict the analysis to parameter values s 2 (s DC ; s DE ].
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In that range the divestiture must go to an entrant …rm to induce the AA to approve the merger.
We start with a symmetric four-…rm Cournot oligopoly (see Vasconcelos, 2010 , for an analogous setting). We invoke the assumption that synergies s can only be created once.
Hence, if a …rm is a result of a previous merger, then that …rm cannot create synergies again. 31 For simplicity, we assume that the realized synergy s is the same for all mergers.
We suppose disjunct sets of possible mergers (see Nocke and Whinston, 2010) . That is, 29 Sequential mergers were analyzed in Nilsson and Sorgard (1998) , who show that merger outcomes are likely to be path-dependent. See Whinston (2010, 2012) for recent contributions which identify conditions such that a myopic merger review is nevertheless subgame perfect.
the initial set of four …rms I = f1; 2; 3; 4g is divided into two subsets of two …rms, say I 1 = f1; 2g and I 2 = f3; 4g. Firms in those sets can merge sequentially (…rstly, …rms in set I 1 , and secondly, …rms in set I 2 ). If …rms in both sets found it optimal to merge, then two new merged …rms M 1 (which is the merger of …rms 1 and 2) and M 2 (which is the merger of …rms 3 and 4) emerge. At the same time (as each merger must have been price-…xing)
entrant …rms E 1 and E 2 have entered the market. In the third stage of the merger game, we allow for any possible bilateral merger. Then, the merger formation process ends and …rms compete in Cournot fashion. To simplify, we assume that …rms have only once the opportunity to merge. Hence, if …rms 1 and 2 (…rms 3 and 4) do not merge in the …rst (second) stage of the game, then they cannot merge in the last stage of the game.
Note that this merger game always induces two mergers in the …rst two stages of the game. Hence, in the …rst stage, …rm 1 proposes a merger with …rm 2 with remedies to an entrant …rm according to Proposition 1. Thus, an entrant …rm enters with capital 1 DE (s). According to Lemma 5, the merger is externality-free. At the end of stage 1, we obtain a new set of …rms which consists of the merged …rm, M 1 , two incumbent competitors 3 and 4, and the entrant …rm E 1 .
In the second stage, …rms 3 and 4 can also propose a merger. The pro…tability of a merger between …rms 3 and 4 follows from noticing that the …rst merger is externality-free.
Firms 3 and 4, therefore, face the same decision problem (i.e., …rst-order conditions) as …rms 1 and 2 in the …rst stage of the game. Hence, …rms 3 and 4 will also …nd it pro…table to propose a merger with exactly the same divestiture 1 DE (s) that was applied to the …rst merger. This remedy creates a new entrant …rm E 2 .
We, therefore, obtain in the third stage a market structure with two large …rms (M 1 and M 2 ) and two symmetric small …rms E 1 and E 2 . It is obvious that a merger between one of the merged …rms and an entrant …rm cannot be approvable as such a merger does 
Solving equations (34) and (35), we obtain the equilibrium outputs Proposition 4 is related to Nocke and Whinston (2010) , where conditions are identi…ed such that a forward looking merger control regime cannot do better than a myopic one.
Our analysis shows that their result carries over when remedies are taken into account and subsequent mergers are possible between newly created competitors. In fact, allowing for subsequent mergers among entering …rms may give rise to additional price reducing e¤ects if synergies can be realized.
Conclusion
We analyzed the e¤ects of remedies on merger activity in a standard Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products under a consumer welfare standard. In general, remedies increase the scope for pro…table mergers that do not harm consumers. Remedial o¤ers must be larger when the merger's synergy level is smaller, which mirrors the proportionality principle in remedy regulations. Moreover, divestitures to an entrant …rm are more e¤ectively countering anticompetitive e¤ects than divestitures to an existing competitor.
The ability of the merging …rms to extract the gains from trade of the asset sale is critical when the purchaser is endogenously determined. That ability is maximal when the merging parties can make a take-it or leave-it o¤er to a pre-selected buyer, in which case the socially preferred divestiture is chosen.
We have also shown that the merging …rms have strong incentives to search for the most e¢ cient buyer as this tends to increase the feasible set of mergers and, at the same time, keeps the asset sales necessary to induce an approval at its lowest possible value.
We also identify instances which lead to mergers under a remedy rule which are strictly price-decreasing. First, a divestiture to an e¢ cient competitor …rm which is able to realize synergies may lead to lower prices, and second, sequential mergers may induce a series of (price-…xing) divestitures which create two new entrant …rms. The entrant …rms can then realize synergies by merging their businesses, which results in a strictly lower price when compared with the price which would prevail in the absence of remedies.
We have assumed that information is complete. If the AA is unsure about the merger's synergies, then the remedy proposal may be used as a signalling device. 32 Introducing incomplete information also evokes new questions concerning the optimally of extreme options (Szalay, 2005) ; that is, the AA may abstain from producing any information on its own when remedies are possible, while it may have stronger incentives to do so when it must either clear or block the merger altogether. Moreover, in an incomplete information setting, the optimality of remedies may also depend on the broader institutional environment, which may vary between inquisitorial or adversial (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999).
price level una¤ected. Hence, the merger is always externality-free: both consumer surplus and the outsider …rms'pro…ts do not change in those instances. This follows directly from inspecting the outsider …rms'…rst-order conditions (8) and (19) under regimes DE and DC, respectively. As the merging …rms …nd it pro…table to proceed with the merger and the bene…ciaries of the remedy can increase their pro…ts it must follow that social welfare increases under regimes DE and DC when compared with regime N R.
The comparison of social welfare under regimes DE and DC for synergy parameters s 2 (s ; s DC ] depends on a comparison of total production costs of the involved …rms.
Total production costs of …rms M , E, and 3 under regime DE are 
